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Sep. 26th, 2016 10:37 amиз книги Ливена,
Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism
Part of the genesis of this book lies in a conversation at a U.S. Embassy party in May 1989 in Islamabad, Pakistan, where I was then working as a stringer for The Times (London), covering both Pakistani affairs and the war in Afghanistan from the side of the mujahideen. The party was in honor of a newly arrived U.S .diplomat, who to the best of my recollection had never worked in Pakistan or any other Muslim country before.I backed up a colleague, Kathy Gannon of the Associated Press, in criticizing U.S. policy on Afghanistan. We argued that especially now that the Soviet forces had left, the United States' giving massive financial and military aid to Pakistan so that its secret service could help mujahideen groups of its choice was lunacy. The groups in question (we were thinking at the time chiefly of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,who since the overthrow of the Taliban has emerged as an anti-American war-lord) and their Arab allies were not only a serious threat to peace and progress in Afghanistan, they were pathologically anti-Western. To this the U.S. diplomat replied that because of his access to intelligence sources, his knowledge of Afghanistan was greater than ours (we had both visited Afghanistan repeatedly with the mujahideen, Kathy for much longer and much more often than I; he had never been there). He said that he was confident that the Afghan resistance was going to build a "successful free market democracy" in Afghanistan. When these arguments were demolished, others emerged: that the destruction of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul was essential to "defeat communism" in the world and that "the Russians did it to us in Vietnam, and we're going to do it to them in Afghanistan." Finally, he declared in exasperation that Kathy and I were "the kind of people who lost us Vietnam." This diatribe encapsulated many of the features of American nationalism addressed in this book. They include the belief of the national security elite that its access to intelligence makes it supremely wise and well informed despite repeated
and catastrophic evidence to the contrary. The belief in the democratization of Afghanistan by the mujahideen reflected a messianism rooted in the American Creed but was accompanied by a total ignorance of Afghan history, society, tradition or reality in general. And the stance of this U.S. representative reflected not only ideology, but a profound indifference verging on contempt. To him, the Afghans were really only a tool against the Soviets, and their ultimate fate was unimportant. This belief was later reflected in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan after the fall of the Soviet Union—or rather lack of policy, for the country was simply abandoned to be torn apart by the mujahideen groups which the United States and its Pakistani allies had armed and financed. Incredibly, this indifference has been replicated again after the over-throw of the Taliban, with American attention and aid immediately diverted into preparations for war with Iraq.
Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism
Part of the genesis of this book lies in a conversation at a U.S. Embassy party in May 1989 in Islamabad, Pakistan, where I was then working as a stringer for The Times (London), covering both Pakistani affairs and the war in Afghanistan from the side of the mujahideen. The party was in honor of a newly arrived U.S .diplomat, who to the best of my recollection had never worked in Pakistan or any other Muslim country before.I backed up a colleague, Kathy Gannon of the Associated Press, in criticizing U.S. policy on Afghanistan. We argued that especially now that the Soviet forces had left, the United States' giving massive financial and military aid to Pakistan so that its secret service could help mujahideen groups of its choice was lunacy. The groups in question (we were thinking at the time chiefly of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,who since the overthrow of the Taliban has emerged as an anti-American war-lord) and their Arab allies were not only a serious threat to peace and progress in Afghanistan, they were pathologically anti-Western. To this the U.S. diplomat replied that because of his access to intelligence sources, his knowledge of Afghanistan was greater than ours (we had both visited Afghanistan repeatedly with the mujahideen, Kathy for much longer and much more often than I; he had never been there). He said that he was confident that the Afghan resistance was going to build a "successful free market democracy" in Afghanistan. When these arguments were demolished, others emerged: that the destruction of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul was essential to "defeat communism" in the world and that "the Russians did it to us in Vietnam, and we're going to do it to them in Afghanistan." Finally, he declared in exasperation that Kathy and I were "the kind of people who lost us Vietnam." This diatribe encapsulated many of the features of American nationalism addressed in this book. They include the belief of the national security elite that its access to intelligence makes it supremely wise and well informed despite repeated
and catastrophic evidence to the contrary. The belief in the democratization of Afghanistan by the mujahideen reflected a messianism rooted in the American Creed but was accompanied by a total ignorance of Afghan history, society, tradition or reality in general. And the stance of this U.S. representative reflected not only ideology, but a profound indifference verging on contempt. To him, the Afghans were really only a tool against the Soviets, and their ultimate fate was unimportant. This belief was later reflected in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan after the fall of the Soviet Union—or rather lack of policy, for the country was simply abandoned to be torn apart by the mujahideen groups which the United States and its Pakistani allies had armed and financed. Incredibly, this indifference has been replicated again after the over-throw of the Taliban, with American attention and aid immediately diverted into preparations for war with Iraq.
